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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
a Volume 1 :  Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
a Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
Volume 3:  Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 4. Correspondence is 
invited. 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3 .  Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for.systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
12 October 1981 
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CHAPTER 4. THE METHODS OF APPUED SYSTEXS ANALYSIS: 
AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 
W. Findeisen and E.S. Quade 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Usually, for a systems analysis to be undertaken, someone involved with a 
sociotechnical system must have a problem-or have recognized a problem 
situation-that is, he must be dissatisfied with the current  or anticipated state of 
affairs and want help in discovering how to bring about a change for the better.  
Systems analysis can almost always provide some help, even if it does no more 
than turn  up relevant information. The goal most frequently sought for systems 
analysis, however, is to discover a course of action that will bring about a 
desired change for the better-that is, a course that  can be adopted as the most 
advantageous by those who have the  authority to act.  
Systems analysis can do more than discover ameliorative solutions, it can 
be used by the responsible policymakers and the  people affected to present fac- 
tual arguments and reliable information to help win acceptance for the solutions 
it discovers. In addition, after a solution is adopted, systems analysis can help 
during implementation to  prevent the  chosen course of action from being 
vitiated by adverse interests, misinterpretations, or unanticipated probl.ems. 
This chapter presents the methods of systems analysis in so far as they 
relate to discovering better  solutions; advice as to how it can be used as an  
instrument of persuasion or t o  aid in implementation is postponed to later 
chapters. The problems of winning acceptance for a course of action and then 
implementing it must, nevertheless, be considered during the process of seehng 
and evaluating a solution, for a proposed course of action that is not acceptable 
to those who must approve it, or that cannot be implemented for political or 
other reasons, cannot be a solution. 
Although a systems analysis may be carried out without a specific decision- 
maker in mind, t h s  is not its most effective use. Ths  chapter discusses the 
approach as if the analysis were being carried out for a single decisionmaker 
who commissioned it. This decisionmaker is assumed to  be an individual who 
wants to make h s  decisions rationally by taking into consideration the probable 
consequences of each of h s  available courses of action, selecting the "best" by 
balancing the extent to which these actions achieve his objectives and possible 
other benefits against their costs. (As a simple extension, we can also consider 
the single decisionmaker to be replaced by a relatively small group with roughly 
similar preferences.) The analyst's basic procedure is to  determine what the 
decisionmaker wants, search out his feasible alternatives, work out the conse- 
quences that would follow the decision to adopt each of the alternatives, and 
then either rank the alternatives in terms of their consequences according to 
criteria specified by the decisionmaker or present them with their conse- 
quences to the decisionmaker for ranking and choice in some framework suit- 
able for comparison. 
In reality, the decisionmaking situation-as the examples discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 3 show-is rarely so uncomplicated; the person for whom a study 
is done is usually no more than a key participant in a decisionmaking process 
who uses the results of the analysis as evidence and argument to bring others to  
hls point of view. The decisionmaking model of the previous paragraph is not 
therefore an adequate model for decisionmaking in the public sector or for pol- 
icy and strategy formulation where large complex systems are concerned. 
These latter decisions cannot be separated from the managerial, organizational 
and/or political situation in which they are made (Mintzberg and Shakun 1978) 
and the  model we are assuming for the decisionmaker (called the  "rational actor 
model" or Model I in Allison (1971) must be supplemented or modfied by bring- 
ing in organizational and political considerations (Allison 1971, Lynn 1978, Rein 
and White 1977). Nevertheless, as Allison (1971, p.268) remarks: "For solving 
problems, a Model I-style analysis provides the best  first cut.  Indeed, for analyz- 
ing alternatives and distinguishing the preferred proposal, there is no clear 
alternative to this basic framework". Therefore, we throughout this chapter 
stick to the  basic, unsophisticated view of the decisionmaking situation. 
As an example to  illustrate the basic procedure, assume that  a legislative 
committee wants to propose legislation to increase bghway safety. It is willing 
to consider measures of three types: a requirement for devices to  make the 
use of seat belts automatic, lowering the maximum speed limit and enforcing it 
more strictly, and establishing higher standards for issuing drivers' licenses. 
They ask the legislative analyst t o  carry out a systems analysis. 
In the simplest systems analysis approach (which is identical to the logic of 
choice paradigm defined by economists e.g., Hitch and McKean 1960) it is useful 
to consider the problem in terms of these elements: 
Objectives, What the decisionmaker desires to  achieve. In the example, it 
is increased highway safety, a concept that  the analysis must make more pre- 
cise. 
Alternatives.  The means by which it may be possible to acheve the  objec- 
tives. In the  example, there are three kin.ds of alternatives. 
Costs. The cost of an alternative is the totality of t hngs  or actions that  
must be given up to acquire the alternative, inclu.ding money, the  use of person- 
nel or facilities for other purposes, and so on. For example, stricter enforce- 
ment of the  speed limit would require more police officers, who must be b r e d  
and trained or taken from other tasks; in either case the action would result in a 
cost to be associated with any speed-control alternative. 
P e r f o r m a n c e  S c a l e s .  A performance or effectiveness scale is a device for 
indicating the extent to whch an objective is attained. It provides a tool for 
evaluating the performances of alternatives in achieving the objective. For 
example, it can be agreed to measure the increase in highway safety by the 
decrease in annual traffic fatalities. Often there are.many possibilities, and the 
choice of a suitable scale can be a problem in itself. 
P e r f o r m a n c e .  The performance or effectiveness of an alternative is the 
position it acheves on the scale. 
Cri ter ion .  A rule for decision that specifies in terms of performance and 
cost how the alternatives are to be ranked. A common one is to rank the alter- 
natives in decreasing order of performance for fixed cost. 
Models .  Explicit models are used to describe, first, a context or state of the 
world in which each alternative might be implemented and then to estimate for 
each alternative the performance, costs, and other consequences that follow 
from its implementation. 
These models are not the only or even the first use of models in a systems 
approach; they are, however, the most prominent for they are likely to be ela- 
borate and programmed for a computer while the other models are often merely 
implicit mental models. In fact, more than one model may be needed to  esti- 
mate the impacts if the alternatives are of different types; a model to estimate 
the monetary costs of doubling the strength of the h h w a y  patrol must differ 
from a model for predicting that the effect the presence of this increased force 
on the hghways will have on traffic fatalities. 
In general, a model is no more than a set of generalizations about the world, 
a simplified image of reality that may be used toinvestigate the outcome.of an 
action without taking it or the behavior of a system without altering it. It is 
made up of the factors relevant to the problem and the essential relations 
among them. A model may take many forms, among them, a set of tables, a 
series of mathematic a1 equations, a computer program, a physical simulation 
(rare for systems analysis), or most often in everyday life merely a mental 
image of the situation in the mind of someone contemplating an action, rarely 
made explicit with a sequence of logical arguments. In one form or another 
models must be used throughout any analytic process. (A more complete dis- 
cussion of systems analysis models is postponed to Chapter 7 and to Volume 2.) 
The objective and systematic approach by means of an explicit model is 
needed for predicting the impacts because, in most systems-analysis problems, 
the factors are so numerous and their interrelations so complex that intuition 
and simple mental models are not good enough. Some highway safety measures, 
for instance, have counterintuitive effects: certain crash barriers reduce fatali- 
ties but increase some kinds of injuries. Others have interdependencies that 
strongly affect their joint performance: an energy-absorbing bumper, for 
instance, would appear to save more lives if it were installed alone than in com- 
bination with a shoulder harness (Goeller 1969). 
In our example, an early problem for the analyst is to find a way to turn the 
vague goal of "increased hghway safety" into something of a more operational 
character, or, in other words, to settle on a way to measure it. One possibility 
might be to use the reduction in the annual number of fatalities as such a meas- 
ure; another might be to use the reduction in the annual (monetary) cost of 
highway accidents to  the victims. There are other possibilities and the full list 
may be a long one. Unfortunately, t b s  choice may affect critically how the 
alternatives are ranked. For instance, whle strict enforcement of the speed 
limit may reduce fatalities, a serious consequence of high-speed collisions, it 
may have little effect on the number and cost of "fender-bending" accidents, 
which are numerous and costly to the participants, while more stringent 
requirements for a driver's license may reduce both significantly. 
Another task for the analyst is to examine the alternatives for. feasibility. It 
may turn out, for example, that, in the current state of the art  of automotive 
engineering, the alternative of automated seat belts is not feasible, say, owing to 
public acceptability considerations. Similarly, the analyst may be able to find 
out that the passage of legislation to lower the current maximum speed limit is 
not politically feasible. This alternative may then have to be reduced merely to  
stricter enforcement of traffic regulations, dropping any thought of lowering the 
maximum speed limit. 
The analyst will also want to search for and examine alternatives not on the 
original list-such things as  better emergency ambulance service, eliminating 
unguarded railroad crossings, changed car  design, and others-for these may 
promise increased hlghway safety a t  no greater cost. Indeed, as we shall 
emphasize in Chapter 6, the  discovery, invention, or  design of new and better 
alternatives is often the real pay off from systems analysis. 
In predicting the impacts associated with the alternatives, as we remarked 
earlier, the analyst may have to use radically different means or methods. A 
model to show the effect of improved driving skills on fatalities can be consider- 
ably different from a model to predict the way a lower speed limit affects them. 
On the other hand, predictions for both cases may be obtained statistically from 
experiences in other jurisdictions with similar driving conditions, although a 
definition of similar may not be easy to decide. Also, to compare alternatives, 
various different futures may have to  be considered, with assumptions made 
about the effects of a petroleum. shortage on automobile traffic, changing car 
preferences, population movement, and other exogenous factors beyond the 
decisionmaker's control that  can affect the outcome. 
One run-through of the set of procedures is seldom enough; several cycles 
or iterations usually improve confidence in the results. For instance, i t  may be 
discovered that the impacts of certain alternatives that restrict automobile 
drivers produce effects tha t  spill. over onto entirely different groups of people, 
say those that ride public tran.sportation, in ways that differ from alternative to 
alternative and were not anticipated when. the alternatives were first formu- 
lated. Additional emergency medical services for traffic-accident victims, for 
instance, may increase the burden on the supply of doctors and hospital beds, 
and hence the analyst may have to enlarge the analysis t o  include aspects of the 
medical system and/or the public transportation systems and carry out 
additional calculations. 
With this background, we now turn to a more detailed and thorough descrip- 
tion of the procedures we have suggested. 
2. A FRAMEWORK FOR SYSEMS ANALYSIS 
Objectives, alternatives. and choice. Analysis to assist someone (called 
here the decisionmaker) to discover h s  "best" course of action may, in general, 
be considered as an inquiry into three basic questions: 
1) What are  his objectives? 
2) What are  his alternatives for attaining these objectives? 
3) How should these alternatives be ranked? 
As defined earlier, the objec t ives  are what a decisionmaker seeks to  accom- 
plish or to attain as a result of his decision, and the a l t e r n a t i v e s  are the means 
available to him for attaining the objectives. Depending on the problem, the 
alternatives may be policies, strategies, designs, actions, or whatever i t  takes to 
attain what is wanted.  ank kin^ implies a listing of the alternatives in order of 
desirability considering the objective and the values the decisionmaker puts on 
the various outcomes that  follow as a consequence of their implementation. 
The three basic questions expand int.0 further questions when we consider 
that: 
- to be,able to  identify the feasible alternatives, one must know not only 
the objectives but also the boundaries within whch the decisionmaker is free to  
act,  that is, the  cons t ra in t s ;  
- to determine the conseguences  ( i m p a c t s )  that  follow from the choice 
of an alternative one must consider that the future is uncertain. 
- to take account of the uncertain future, we need a predict.lve model  
showing what will happen if the decisionmaker chooses an alternati.ve, given 
each particular contingency, or alternative future s t a t e  of the  w o r l d  considered. 
- to rank the alternatives, it is necessary to investigate the 
decisionmaker's value s y s t e m  and possibly that of other parties whose opinions 
the decisionmaker may wish or be forced to consider. 
Different models, from very rough to very precise, may be used as we 
proceed in the analysis from the first rough screening to eliminate the clearly 
unsatisfactory alternatives, through various iterations to reach the final rank- 
ing. 
A framework for analysis. Systems analysis to aid decisionmaking, like sci- 
ence, is a craft activity (Majone 1960). The way in which a study is organized and 
carried out depends on many choices by the analyst that are often based on lit- 
tle more than experience and intuition. An approach that  may produce valuable 
insights when used by one analyst may yield faulty or misleading conclusions 
when used by another. Nevertheless, every systems analysis will be composed of 
certain more or less typical activities that  have to be appropriately linked to 
each other. From this point of view, we can present a first approximation to the 
systems-analysis process schematically as in Figure 1, where the main com- 
ponents are  represented (other breakdowns are, of course, possible): 
1) Formulating the problem. 
2) Identifying, designing, and selecting the alternatives to be evaluated. 
3) Forecasting future contexts or states of the world. 
. 4) ' Building and using models for predicting the consequences 
5) Comparing and ranking the alternatives. 
These components encompass several additional activities, two of which are 
indicated in Figure I: determining the constraints and determining the 
decisionmaker's values  and criteria. Among those omitted from the figure, but 
needed for every analysis, are data  collection and analysis,  and communication 
between analyst  and decision.maker. Too, this figure does not show the followup 
activities that may ensue from a systems analysis study whose recommenda- 
tions are adopted, or the evaluation work that  may accompany the implementa- 

tion process. 
The solid lines in Figure 1 show the principal flows of information from 
activity to activity. 
Iteration and Feedback. In most investigations few of the component 
activities depicted in Figure 1 can be performed adequately in a single trial. 
Iteration is needed; that is, preliminary results, or even an incomplete version of 
the final result, may force the analyst to alter initial assumptions, revise earlier 
work, or collect more data. A decisionmaker, for instance, may not settle on his 
objectives until he has a good idea of what he can do, or he may want to impose 
additional constraints after he discovers what some of the impacts are. 
Figure 2 shows some of the typical iterations and feedback loops in a sys- 
tems analysis study. 
One feedback loop is from the impacts (the consequences) to designing 
alternatives. By this loop one modifies or refines some alternatives, typically by 
adjustmg their parameters, and eliminates others. The process of refinement 
through iteration may be done separately for each alternative; it is sometimes 
based on a formal optimization procedure. 
Another typical loop is the one from the model results back to problem for- 
mulation. This iteration is necessary because i t  is usually impossible to set the 
objectives and determine the constraints with precision before knowing some- 
thing about their implications. A first cut may also suggest a need for redefining 
the alternatives; in fact, we may have to  design an entirely new set of alterna- 
tives. 
Furthermore, we may be dissatisfied with the results obtained under o w  
current assumptions and constraints. Iterations may be carried out to see what 
the "cost" of the constraint is, that is, how much more of the objective could be 
obtained or how much the monetary cost could be lowered if a constraint were 
weakened. We may eventually negohate removing, or softening, some of the 
constraints. If this is not possible, lowering the objectives of the decisionmaker 

may have to take place. 
Another important purpose of iteration is to improve the models used for 
prediction, a process that  may actually result in simplification, as elements and 
relations originally thought to be significant are  found to have negligible effect. 
Analysis does not necessarily end, even when iteration through these stages 
no longer brings significant improvement and the various courses of action open 
to the decisionmaker have been compared, ranked, and presented for his 
choice. As mentioned in the introduction, an  analyst, although not necessarily 
the orlginal one, may also be needed to provide assistance with additional 
tasks-helping t o  resolve unanticipated problems arising during discussions with 
other decisionmakers or arising during implementation of the decisions, and, 
even much later, after the process of implementation has succeeded (or failed), 
evaluating the entire procedure. 
Although most of the infeasible alternatives should have been eliminated 
during the earlier stages of the analysis, the implementability of a course of 
action may remain a question even after implementation is well under way. One 
reason is that  the final decision may not have been presented in a way adequate 
to instruct and motivate those who have to execute it and who may have their 
own ideas as to how to interpret it. There may also be considerations that are 
important for implementation, but whch were not important to  the choice 
between alternatives and which, in order to  keep the problem workable, had not 
been spelled out in detail. But the passage of time is the most frequent cause. 
Implementation may not start  or  may continue for so long after the 
analysis was completed that changes in the state of the world different from any 
of those forecast in the analysis may require the implementation process to be 
modified. What was "the future" during the analysis becomes the present, and 
an analyst may be needed once again to  modify a program that may now be par- 
tially inappropriate. Indeed, the need for complete reanalysis can never be 
totally dismissed. 
Finally, the analyst may be called on to assist the decisionmaker to evalu- 
ate the progress of the implementation, for, by virtue of his previous studies of 
the problem and h s  knowledge of the cause-effect relations, he  may be able to 
detect the reasons for discrepancies and deviations from the effects originally 
intended. 
Communication. Communication is an  important factor for the success of 
systems analysis. Communication with the decisionmaker is vital, for his advice 
and judgments are indispensable a t  all stages of the analysis and he must not be 
surprised a t  the end. The results are much more likely to be accepted and used 
if he participates in producing them. Throughout the procedure there should 
therefore be a continuous dialogue between the analyst and the 
decisionrnaker,including his staff. Ths  dialogue influences the decisionmaker's 
attitude toward the problem even before the study is finished, and helps to 
make sure that  the important facets of the real situation are considered. The 
constant exchange of information also gives the staff a sense of participating in 
the study and means that the results will not come them cold, with a sense of 
shock-a circumstance that can lead t o  their rejection. 
Another reason for continuing communication is that  the initial problem 
formulation can never be complete and all-inclusive. As mentioned above, prel- 
iminary results of the analysis will modify the initial views, new questions will 
arise, and the preferences, constraints, and time horizons may change. 
Stages of analysis. There are many more linkages between the component 
activities of systems analysis than those shown in Figure 2. Despite this complex 
in.terdependence, it is convenient to discuss the procedure in three stages: 
A. Formula tion 
B. Research, comprising 
- Generating and investigating alternatives 
- Forecasting the contexts 
- Determining the consequences 
C. Evaluation 
We shall characterize the stages of systems analysis, as well as the more 
important component activities, in more detail. 
Partial analysis. Before doing this, however, we note that not every 
systems-analysis study contains every stage or component. Some studies may 
be useful even though they lack some of the steps in the very general schematic 
presentation in Figure 1; we refer to such studies as partial analyses. Here are 
some typical examples: 
- Forecasts of the future state of the world, where no immediate action 
by a decisionmaker is contemplated; for example, econometric forecasts, whch 
analysts are asked to provide for governments or large industrial companies. 
- Impact analysis, i.e., determining all impacts, or even merely a cer- 
tain class of impacts, of a proposed course of action. For example, studies to 
determine the consequences of a particular technological development on the 
environment may involve no comparison or ranking. 
- Decision analysis, that is, assistance in making a choice among a lim- 
ited number of well specified alternatives, whose consequences are assumed to 
be known. Here the analysis merely provides a framework for ranking these 
alternatives. A typical instance is the choice of an industrial project from 
among several available alternatives, or a decision to buy equipment from corn- 
petitive suppli.ers. 
In these examples, not all of the component activities of a complete sys- 
tems analysis are carried out by the analysts. On the other hand, there are 
cases where all the activities are present, but where some of them need to be 
emphasized more than others. 
Whenever a partial analysis is commissioned, the assumption is that some- 
one, usually the decisionmaker, is providing the missing aspects. Generally the 
decisionmaker will do this purely by judgment or assumption for, although some 
decisionmakers have the ability to carry out the required analysis themselves, 
they rarely have the time. 
3. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Goals and difficulties. Generally speaking, problem formulation (the sub- 
ject of Chapter 5) implies isolating the questions or issues involved, fixing the 
context within which these issues are  to be resolved, clarifying the objectives, 
identifying the people to be affected by the decision, discovering the major 
operative factors, and deciding on the initial approach to be taken in the 
analysis. It is expected that  problem formulation will provide, among other 
things: 
(a) a preliminary statement of the objectives, and ways to  measure their 
achievement, 
(b) a specification of some promising courses of action, i .e.,  the alterna- 
tives, 
(c) a definition of the  constraints, 
(d) an  anticipation of the type of consequences to be expected, the meas- 
ures of their importance, and a definition of the  criteria for choice. 
Problem formulation should result in specifying the limits of the inquiry, 
the questions to be addressed, and the aspects of the real world to  be included, 
in what time frame, with what analytic resources. The scope of the  problem can 
be limited by limiting the number and type of alternative actions to  be con- 
sidered but i t  is not possible to confine the effects of these actions wi thn neat 
boundaries. 
As one aspect of probl.em formulation, the analyst must consider the ana- 
lytic approach to be taken, whch,  of course, depends on the information wanted 
and the type of problem. For example, if the deci.sionmaker has been assigned a 
fixed budget, the analysis may take the form of an attempt to  discover the alter- 
native, attainable with the given budget, that  will enable him to achieve, or  most 
nearly achieve, his objective. Alternatively, it may be that  progress is required 
in correcting some undesirable condition. The analytic objective may then 
become to discover the point a t  whch  the marginal benefits of corrective action 
become equal to the marginal costs. Another possibility is that  the analysis 
should be directed toward ascertaining whether some proposed course of action 
yields a sufficiently high rate of return on the required investment to make it 
attractive. 
As the study progresses and more information becomes available, the ana- 
lytic approach may have to  be modified. 
Formulation involves critical assumptions made by the analyst because 
alternative formulations leading to different outcomes may seem equally ten- 
able. The decisionmaker's advice is crucial here in deciding which formulation 
is right. The effort spent restating the problem in different ways, or redefining 
it ,  clarifies whether or not it is spurious or trivial, and may, indeed, point the 
way toward a solution. Until the problem has been defined and the issues clari- 
fied, i t  may not be clear that the study effort will be worthwhile. The great pit- 
r 
fall is that  the result depends on the undeJying assumptions made by the formu- 
lator and he and the decisionrnaker may not be aware of what these are.  
Among the difficulties of problem formulation these usually stand out: 
(i) No issue is isolated; every system is linked to  other systems and it is 
thus part  of a larger one. There is th-erefore a mutual dependence of the objec- 
tives, constraints, and consequences. 
(ii) We cannot set  the objectives firmly unless we know what can be 
achieved, that  is, until we know-with reasonable accuracy-the results of 
analysis. 
(iii.) The objectives, as well as the measures of value and the criteria for 
choice, are hghly subjective and depend on the decisionmaker's preferences, 
which may be both difficult to assess and. varying over time. Ths  applies, in par- 
ticular, to  high-level objectives, which are seldom stated in any sort of opera- 
tional form. 
For many reasons, the problem-formulation stage can be seen as a small- 
scale systems analysis study in itself. I t  may involve a very broad range of 
inquiries into the hierarchies of objectives, the value systems, the various types 
of constraints, the alternati~res available, the presumed consequences, how the 
people affected will react  to the consequences, etc. The models used for predic- 
tion, however, are still crude and may be entirely judgmental. A systematic 
approach to  problem formulation through some fairly formal device such as an 
"issue paper" may be desirable; Chapter 5 describes this device and provides 
other information about problem formulation. . 
Objectives. The objectives are what a decisionmaker seeks to accomplish 
or to attain by means of his decision, that is, by the  course of action he decides 
to implement. 
The analyst has to determine what the decisionmaker's objectives actually 
are; Chapters 5 and 8 give a more thorough discussion of the difficulties that are 
frequently encountered a t  this stage. For the present purpose, we state merely 
that an objective may be specified in a more or less general fashion, may be 
quantified or not quantified, and is usually a step in a hieTaTchy of objectives;  
one speaks about different leve ls  of the objectives. 
Often the levels of objectives differ according to the time horizon. For 
example, in economic planning, or in corporate planning, there is a hierarchy of 
short-term and long-term objectives that have to be consistent with one 
another. 
The fear of setting objectives that may prove to be inconsistent with 
hgher-level, more comprehensive objectives may lead a decisionmaker to 
specify an objective a t  too high a level to be helpful in the analysis. For one rea- 
son, the courses of action that are required to attain t h s  higher level objective 
may not be his to choose. 
It is the objectives that suggest the possible alternatives, for, to. be con- 
sidered an  alternative, a course of action must appear to  offer some chance of 
attaining the objectives. As more information becomes available and the origi- 
nal alternatives are proved to  be infeasible, new alternatives must be 
discovered. If these too prove infeasible, the decisionmaker may have to  change 
his objectives. 
Unless the objectives are correctly and clearly spelled out, the rest of the 
analysis will be misdirected-wrong and ineffectual alternatives will be proposed 
that  do not favorably affect the problem that  generated the analysis. To define 
objectives it is often helpful to call on several people not involved with the prob- 
lem under analysis, particularly outsiders skeptical of what they think the 
decisionmaker is trying to do. Another possibility is to start  by specifying a 
measure of performance that seems appealing and then examining the objec- 
tives it serves. In effect, one keeps trying to answer such questions as: What is 
the decisionmaker really trying to accomplish? What ultimate good result is 
desired? For example, what objective is really served by lowering the speed 
limit? 
We would like to be able, for the sake of analysis, to  measure the degree to 
which an  objective will be attained by a course of action under consideration. 
For this reason, if the original objective cannot be qu.antified, one must often 
define a prozy object ive:  a substitute that points in the same direction as the 
original objective, but which can be measured. For example, "income" might be 
be a proxy for "quality of life." Sometimes the proxy is one dimension of a 
multi-dimensional objective, as when "reduction in mean travel time" is used as 
a proxy for "improved transportation. service." In such. a case it may be better 
to use a weighted index in which all dimensions are represented (Raiffa 1968). 
If the degree to  whch  the objective has been attained is measurable in 
some sense, one can set  a target value; for example, "achieve an  average travel 
time of 40 minutes." Often, to be more flexible, we prescribe an interval, for 
example, "achieve an average travel time of less than 4-5 minutes," whch leaves 
more freedom for the choice of alternatives. 
In many cases, the decisionmaker seeks multiple objectives, which fre- 
quently contribute to a single higher-level objective, although we may not be 
able to measure how much each individual objective contributes. 
An example of such a situation is "the quality of urban life," as a higher- 
level objective to which several component objectives, such as better housing, 
less air pollution, reduced travel times, less aesthetic discomfort, and others, 
contribute. If we cannot work out the relative contribution of each factor, we 
ordinarily seek alternatives that  improve, in a measurable degree, all, or the 
majority, of the contributing component objectives, leaving the ultimate ranking 
to the decisionmakers. 
Multiple objectives are  usually competitive, i.e., an  alternative designed to  
bring about maximum improvement in one of them is associated with a 
deterioration in some of others, because of limited resources or other con- 
straints. For example, a desire for a decrease in noise pollution may force 
undesirable constraints on the rapidity of urban transportation. 
To reconcile multiple objectives may present a serious problem, as treated 
in Chapter 8 and in numerous publications (for example, Raiffa 196B; Keeney and 
Raiffa 1977: Bell, Keeney, and R d f a  1976). 
Values and criteria. A course of action will have many consequences, some 
contributing to a particular objective, some detracting, with still others being 
side effects, that is, consequences that  are neutral with respect to the objective, 
but possibly with productive or counterproductive implications. If we wish to 
say how good an alternative is, we need a measure of value for each of its signifi- 
cant consequences. If we want, moreover, to be able to compare different alter- 
natives in ord.er to in&cate a preference, we need criteria for ranking them. 
A measure of value is subjective. The same thing may be of different value 
to different people. In practice, the values of the decisionrnaker overri.de those 
of all other interested parties, because he will decide whether or not to  take a 
given course of action. But, in all cases, the preferences of the persons or 
groups the decisionmaker is serving, or of those who will be affected by his deci- 
sion, must be considered, for he may not only want to take them into account, 
but feel it necessary in order to implement what he wants done. 
For example, consider the air pollution t o  be caused by a future industrial 
plant. If no pollution standards or penalties exist, does this mean that  the 
industrial manager can neglect pollution, although he knows the damage it will 
cause? Clearly, he cannot do so without considering the cost of the decision to 
do so, because the people affected may, in one way or another (say through 
their influence on future standards imposed by the state) affect the profits of 
the plant. It is the duty of the analyst, in such a case as this, to indicate the 
impact of pollution on those who will be affected, and somehow to  transfer their 
subsequent dissatisfaction t o  the decisionmaker's balance sheet. 
The values held by the  decisionmaker, that is to say, the importance he 
attribuLes to the various impacts, determine the criteria for ranking the alter- 
natives; hence the decisionmaker's values must be investigated at  an early 
stage. 
The aim of the systems analyst, especially when working for a client, is not 
to say what the decision ought to be; he should only say that, given the criterion 
and his best knowledge about the client's preferences and those of the other 
impacted parties, the alternatives should be ranked in a certain order. As soon 
as the analyst makes recommendations, based on his own values, as to what the 
decision should be, the anaIyst is aband-oning h s  role as an analyst and becom- 
ing an  advocate. Ths  may be an appropriate role in some cases, but when 
assumed the analyst should make clear what he is doing. 
More attention to the problem of criteria is given in section 7 and in 
Chapter 8. 
Constraints. Constraints are restrictions on the alternatives; they may be 
physical properties of systems, natural limitations, or politically imposed boun- 
daries that do not permit certain actions to be taken. Thus, the constraints 
imply that certain consequences cannot be obtained and that certain objectives 
cannot be acheved. The alternatives, consequences, and objectives that are not 
prohibited, directly or indirectly, by the constraints are referred to as feasible. 
Some examples of possible constraints are: physical laws, natural-resource 
limitations, available manpower, existing legislation, accepted ethics, allocated 
investment money. 
Some constraints will be discovered during problem formulation, but others 
not until the impacts are known; some political or cultural constraints may not 
be imposed until implementation has started and opposition has had time to 
develop. 
The question of feasibility is an important, if not dominant, component in 
systems analysis, and usually a difficult one to deal with. Finding a feasible 
alternative, just any feasible alternative, may be a satisfactory result for 
analysis. An investgation of the feasibility of actions or objectives is referred to 
as feasibility analysis. 
There are many different kinds of constraints. Some are permanent and 
can never be violated (physical laws, global resources). Others are binding in 
the short run, but may be changed by the passage of time or removed by inven- 
tion or by improvement in the state of the art .  Still others are man made, set 
by the political situation or merely by the decisionrnaker's tastes. 
There are different constraints at different levels of decisionmaking. Usu- 
ally the lower the level of decision, the more constraints there will be to con- 
sider. For example, an analysis of alternative urban transportation systems 
would have to consider a cost constraint, air and noise pollution standards, and 
perhaps also an employment constraint. All these are constraints im.posed by 
decisions made at  a higher level, usually of the resource-allocation type, and not 
&rectly by the available resources. 
Depending on their character (objectively existing, or imposed by a deci- 
sion) the various constraints are  treated in essentially two different ways. Some 
constraints are r i g i d  or u n q u e s t i o n a b l e ;  to this category certainly belong the 
constraints of natural laws and global resources. We have already indicated, 
however, that resources may be rigid only at a particular decision level. For a 
city, or an industrial plant, the resource constraints are often the result of an 
allocation decision and may therefore be considered e la s t i c  or n e g o t i a b l e .  By 
elastic or negotiable constraints we mean ones that  may, in principle, be 
changed by a higher-level decision if the analysis provides a good case for the 
change. Providing the case may consist, for example, in showing how much 
more of the objective can be gained if the constraint is changed by various 
amounts. A calculation of this kind is a form of marginal analysis. It may hap- 
pen, for example, that a slight lowering of the standard of admissible pollution 
would cause a substantial reduction in the cost of producing an  industrial pro- 
duct. Analysis of this type can thus determine the cost of the constraint; we 
should not forget, however, that  expressed in t h s  way, it is the cost of the con- 
straint to  the polluting party, not to those w6o are being polluted. 
As already said, it cannot be expected that all constraints, and much less so 
the feasible sets that  result from the constraints, will be revealed a t  the initial 
stage of problem formulation. Nevertheless, it is important to  determine a t  
least the  most influential constraints initially. With respect to those resulting 
from higher-level decisions, it is desirable to  get  some feel as to how firm these 
constraints are  and, in particular, whether they are defined and definite for the 
whole time horizon. Otherwi.se, the analysis may investigate actions or alterna- 
tives that  will be entirely inappropriate. 
For a further discussion of constraints, see Majone ( 1 9 7 8) . 
4. GENERATING AND SELECTING ALTERNATIVES 
It can hardly be overstressed that  generating alternatives is, in systems 
analysis, an exercise of creativity and imagination appropriately tempered by a 
thorough and broad knowledge of the issues. The alternatives that have to be 
considered in a particular case may be wide-ranging and need not be ob ious  
substitutes for each other or perform the same spectrum of functions. Thus, for 
example, education, recreation, family subsidy, police surveillance, and low- 
income housing (either alone or combined in various ways) may all have to be 
considered as possible alternatives for combating juvenile delinquency. In addi- 
tion, the alternatives are not merely the options known to the decisionmaker 
and the analysts at  the start ;  they include whatever additional options can be 
discovered or invented later. 
The set of potential alternatives initially includes all courses of action that  
offer some chance of attaining or partially attaining the objectives. Later, as 
the  constraints are discovered, the se t  is reduced. Whenever it is sensible t o  dp 
so, the "null" alternative, the case of no action, should be included for the pur- 
pose of comparison. 
In most cases, a number of alternatives are explicitly suggested by the 
decisionmaker, i.e., they are defined by a more or less detailed enumeration of 
their specific characteristics. Others are discovered or invented by the 
analysts. 
Certain properties of the alternatives, whle they m.ay not be specifically 
demanded by the objectives and criteria, as stated by the decisionmaker, 
nevertheless are important and likely to  be consid.ered later in h s  eva1uati.on 
and hence should be considered by the analyst in their design. 
One of these, an alnsost indispensable feature of an acceptable alternative, 
is its insensitivity (robustness), measured by the degree to  which attainment of 
the objectives will be sustained despite disturbances encountered in normal 
operation, such as varying loads, changing weather conditions, etc. In urban 
transportation, insensitivity could mean, for example, that  the average travel 
time does not greatly increase even when the peak-load and street traffic are 
increased by 25% or more. 
Another feature important for many applications is reliability, which is the 
probability that the system is operational at any given time, as opposed to being 
out of order. In some cases, it is important for the proposed system never to 
fail; in others, that it not fail for a time longer than some threshold value; and in 
still other cases, a failure is tolerable if it can be repaired quickly; t h s  feature, 
in turn, brings us to the question of maintenance and, consequently, logistics. 
A system is vulnerable if damage or failure of an element causes consider- 
able trouble in meeting the objectives (vulnerability does not mean, or does not 
necessarily mean, complete failure). In the urban transportation example, a 
bus system is vulnerable to snow storms. One would like an alternative with low 
vulnerability. 
Flexibility is a property exhibited by an alternative designed to do a certain 
job that can also be used with reasonable success for a modified, or even an 
entirely different, purpose. It is important to have a flexible alternative when 
the objectives may change or when the uncertainties are very great. For exam- 
ple, for transferring fuel, rail transportation is more flexible than pipelines. 
In addition, each alternative that survives the other feasibility tests must 
be examined with implementation in mind. Some alternatives will be easier to 
implement than others; those impossible to implement must be eliminated and 
the cost of implementation associ-ated with each of the others must be taken 
into account. 
Generating alternatives is above all a craft or ar t ,  an exercise of imagina- 
tion, creativity, criticism, and experience. It is the diversity of alternative ways 
of attaining an objectlve, so often encountered in socio technical system prob- 
lems, that calls for creativity and ingenuity rather than for a deep knowledge of 
formal tools. Therefore, what we say below can only be a loose guideline. a 
framework, which may be of assistance in some cases and useless in others. 
Whenever a diversity of means exists to achieve the objectives, generating 
and selecting alternatives are best done in steps or stages. Initially, it is 
appropriate to consider a fairly large number of possiblities as alternatives; any 
scheme that has a chance of being feasible and of meeting the objectives should 
be investigated. At the beginning, it is good to encourage invention and uncon- 
ventionality; foolish ideas may not appear so foolish when looked at more 
closely. It may often be advisable to reach beyond the less rigid constraints, to 
broaden the scope of the study outside the limits that were initially set by the 
client. Compare, for instance, Ackoff (1974). 
The many alternatives that are considered initially cannot be investigated 
in detail. It would be too costly and, above all, excessively time-consuming. 
Some kind of screening, based on expert judgment, evidence from past cases, or 
simple models, can often be used to  select a few of the alternatives as more 
promising for the next stages of investigation. It may, for example, be possible 
to reject some alternatives by dominance: i.e., because another alternative 
exists that is better in at least one aspect and equally good in all the remaining 
significant aspects. 
The stages that follow the initial scrut~ny shculd involve an increasing 
amount of quantitative assessment. At first, the assessment of the conse- 
quences of each alternative may still miss many details, but it should be ade- 
quate to permit rejecting a fair percentage of the original alternatives on the 
ground that the other cases are more promising. 
The last stage of the selection procedure should investigate relatively few 
alternatives, but in considerable detail. These alternatives should be serious 
candidates for implementation. At t h s  stage every effort should be made to 
assess each alternative as accurately as possible, and each one may have to be 
fine-tuned to yield the best results possible. At this stage, systems analysis 
overlaps with "systems design" or "systems engineering," where-for example, 
for an industrial plant-the job is to determine all specifications for the consecu- 
tive design of the particular parts of the plant. 
Fine tuning is an activity that may, in appropriate cases, make good use of 
mathematical models. The problems are usually well defined when fine tuning is 
appropriate and setting the details may be ideal for formal procedures for 
optimization, such as linear programming. 
As can be seen, we favor a procedure of step-by-step rejection of alterna- 
tives rather than one of focusing on selecting the best alternative in a single 
operation. This procedure has some rationale; first, the alternatives that are 
shown to be Infeasible can be rejected (irrespective of what they promise in 
terms of benefits); next, the alternatives that can be shown to be markedly sen- 
sitive or vulnerable can be rejected, etc. It is, in many cases of judgment, easier 
to agree on rejection than to agree on positive selection. 
5. FORECASTING FUTURE STATES OF THE WORLD 
Forecasting in systems analysis. Forecasting is needed in every systems 
analysis. Before any proposed action can be evaluated, we require a forecast of 
the future "state of the world," or context in which the action of some sort is to 
be taken. Forecasting is indicated even when we just want to discover i f  action 
is needed. Weather forecasting is one example, econometric forecasts used to 
draw inferences about the future state of national economies are another. We 
should note that, although sophisticated models and extensive statistical data 
analyses are used in these two forecasts, we do not insist on knowing the cause- 
effect relations. The forecasting models show correlations, but may fail to show 
dependencies. I t  is a common pitfall to neglect the difference, and thus to draw 
false conclusions about what a deliberate action may bring about. For example, 
we cannot cause rainfall by forcing the birds to fly a t  low alt~tudes, although the 
two facts are known to be strongly correlated in some climates (because both of 
them are effects of the same cause-air humidity). 
A forecast of the future state of the world is, of course, needed in order to 
predict the consequences of an alternative, because these consequences depend 
on both the properties of the alternative .and the context in which it is 
implemented. If our confidence in the accuracy of the forecast is not extremely 
Q h ,  the usual case, we will want to carry out the analysis for several different 
projections of possible states of the world. 
Forecasting techniques. Forecasting future states of the world can be done 
in a variety of ways. Techniques range from "scenario writing" (i.e., preparing a 
se t  of assumptions about the future state of the world generated by tracing out 
a hypothetical chain of events) to  mathematical forecasting models. Whatever 
technique is used, a forecast is always based on past and current  data, observa- 
tions, or measurements. When expert judgment alone is employed, it is carried 
out to a large extent implicitly. Systems analysis forecasting is based on quanti- 
tative models supplemented by scenario writing. 
It may be appropriate, at t h s  point, to indicate that  even the best forecast- 
mg technique determines the future only in a probabilistic way. For example, it 
may-in the best case-state the expected value and the variance, o r  the confi- 
dence interval within which the value will be contained with some probability. 
The variance, or the confidence interval just mentioned, is bound to increase as 
the future considered is more distant. A forecasting technique should be chosen 
that  is not too sophisticated for the available data. If data are scarce or inaccu- 
rate, simple judgmental forecasting models are often as good as the very com- 
plex ones. It may be impractical, in the early stages of analysis when more qual- 
itative answers are sought, to  attempt to use the more complex forecasting 
models. 
In some applications of systems analysis it is appropriate t o  replace a pro- 
babilistic forecast of the future or an  impartial scenario by an  active element, 
an  element that will respond to  our actions in such a way as to  purposely upset 
the potential benefits. 
For example, when a plan for developing water resources is being con- 
sidered., we may ask whether the water demands of all users will be satisfied 
under all possible circumstances i f  this plan is implemented. Thj.s questlon calls 
for an examination of the worst case of the weather and other conditions. We 
can, for that purpose, treat the state of nature as acting against us. In the 
model, we can assign the role of nature to an antagonistic player, and thus make 
use of g a m i n g .  Needless to say, to get reasonable conclusions, the action possi- 
bilities available to the opponent will have to be bounded in some way: otherwise, 
no water system could withstand the test. In any case, the game may reveal 
what exogenous conditions are the most dangerous, and we can then try to 
assess whether these conditions are likely to happen. 
In many analyses there is a need to consider infrequent contingencies, 
events or conditions that may happen whose probabilities are low or very low, 
but which-if they happen-have significant consequences. Usually, these conse- 
quences are of a detrimental nature-if they were benefits we would not worry. 
6. DlTKRMINING THE CONSEQWENCES 
The future and uncertainty. An important analytic task is to predict the 
consequences -(also referred to as impacts, effects, or outcomes) of each alter- 
native that is being considered. As this prediction depends on the context or 
state of the world before and during the period in which the alternative is imple- 
mented, the results are uncertain. To get an idea of the nature of this uncer- 
tainty, the predictions are usually made for several alternative futures. 
Given a particular forecast or assumption about the future of the world, 
assessing a course of action involves answering two questions: 
(i) What will happen as a result of t h s  action? 
(ii) What will happen without this action? 
Neither of these questions can ever be answered with certainty, because 
both still involve one or more forecasts of future conditions, i.e., of the future 
states of the world, or a t  least; the segment of the world being considered in the 
study. 
A particular alternative will have a large number of consequences. Some of 
these are b e n e f i t s ,  things that one would like tr, have and which contribute posi- 
tively to attaining the objectives; others are costs, negative values, things that  
one would like to  avoid or minimize. Some of the consequences associated with 
an  alternative, although they may have so little apparent effect, positive or 
negative, on attaining the desired objective that they are  not considered in the 
evaluation, nevertheless may significantly affect o r  spill over on the interests of 
other groups of people or other decisionmakers. These, in turn, may be able to 
affect the decision through pressure on the decisionmaker or by making their 
objections known during the process of implementation. It may therefore 
become necessary in the course the study t o  enlarge i t  by introducing these 
effects or spillovers into the comparison of alternatives. 
In the broad sense, costs are the opportunities foregone-all the things we 
cannot have or do once we have chosen a particular alternative. Many, but by no 
means all, costs can be expressed adequately in money or other quantitative 
terms. Others cannot. For example, if the goal of a decision is to lower automo- 
bile traffic fatalities, the delays imposed on motorists by schemes that force a 
lower speed in a relatively uncrowded and safe section of road will be considered 
a cost by most drivers. Such delay not only has a negative value in itself, which 
may be expressed partially in monetary terms, but it may cause irritation and 
speeding elsewhere and thus lead to an increased accident rate or even to a con- 
tempt for law, a chain of negative consequences difficult to quantify. 
An important question, and one of the analyst's important decisions, is to 
determine which consequences to consider. Which are the relevant ones? We 
cannot avoid some assessment of the magnitudes and values of the conse- 
quen.ces a t  an early stage. For practical reasons, analysis must be limited: if we 
consider too many phenomena in the  physical, economic, and social environ- 
ment  as being related to  the issue under investigation (too many impacts), then 
the analysis will become expensive, time-consuming, and ineffective. The impor- 
tant consequences are  those the decisionmaker will take into account in making 
h s  decision, but his list may have to be amplified, for he is an interested party 
and may stress beneficial outcomes while neglecting those implying costs 
irrelevant to h m  but detrimental to others. 
Therefore, the major responsibility is with the analyst: what consequences 
to consider is one of the important secondary decisions in the study. There is 
little, if any, theory on whch to base this decision. Initial assessments based on 
experience, common sense, and understanding of the issue are a starting point, 
but may have to be revised in the course of analysis. 
There is one more question related to listing the relevant consequences. 
How far  ahead into the future shall the consequences be considered? 
At least three factors influence the answer: 
- first, how far-reaching are the objectives (what is the decisionmaker's 
time horizon)?, 
- second, how long will the consequences (beneficial and detrimental) 
last? and 
- third, how important is the future regarded in comparison with the 
present (what is the discount rate)? 
These first two factors are quite different, and they may be conflicting in 
the sense that a n  action taken to achieve a short-term objective may have long- 
lasting consequences that m.ake it harder to achieve an objective more remote 
in time. The time horizon of analysis has to be matched to both; the analyst is 
obliged to tell a short-sighted decisionmaker what the consequences of his 
action wi1.l be in the more distant future. 
The t h r d  factor may be overriding; if we are not concerned about the 
future (if our discount rate is hgh) ,  then it is of little significance how long the 
consequences extend. 
Predictive models. The consequences of future action cannot be measured 
or observed; they must be predicted or estimated from our present understand- 
ing of the future situation and of what the real relations are between the con- 
templated action and its consequences. 
While models of many sorts may be used for prediction, the models most 
used, and often the only type even considered for this purpose by analysts, are 
mathematical models, frequently in the form of a computer program. A 
mathematical model consists of a set of equations and other formal relations 
that attempt to represent the processes and circumstances that  determine the 
outcome of alternative actions. These models, as do any models, depend for 
their validity on the  quality of the scientific information they represent. Our 
current capability to design mathematical models in whose predictions we have 
confidence is limited, at  least for questions of public policy, where social and 
political considerations tend to dominate. Here, what are often regarded as less 
satisfactory judgmental models, that  depend more, and more directly, on exper- 
tise and intuition and are  not as precise and manageable, may have to be used. 
I t  is convenient, in these models, to dstinguish two sets  of factors that 
influence the consequences y simultaneously: the action a and the  state of the 
world e .  "The state of the world" is a name given to the set  of all exogenous fac- 
tors, that is, ones beyond control by action a,  but which nevertheless influence 
the consequences y. The important convenience of this approach is that the 
forecast of the future conditions, and therefore most of the uncertainty, is now 
contained in the independent, partially random, value of e. We can write 
y = f ( a , e ) ,  
where we mean that  y depends on both a and e. 
The relation (1) may be considered the general form of a p r ~ d i c t i v e  mode l .  
I t  is "predictive" in the sense that ,  given a and e ,  i t  determines y .  We do not 
imply, by any means, that (1) has some particular form, e.g., that it is a formal 
mathematical model. I t  may be a "mental model," contained in an expert's 
mind, never written down in any form, that nevertheless can supply statements 
of the sort: "if action a is taken, given condition e ,  y will result." 
The object system and its environment. We take a pragmatic approach to 
predictive modeling. Rather than assuming that everything is related to, and 
mfluences, everything else, we draw a boundary between what has an  influence 
on the consequences that we consider, and what has none (not all the outside 
world is considered to  be the environment), and we draw another boundary 
between what we influence by an action (the consequences), and what we do not 
influence. The actual decision as to where to set  these boundaries is made ten- 
tatively when the problem is first formulated, then revised, possibly several 
times, first when a crude model is designed to  screen the alternatives, next 
when more refined models are designed to predict the consequences more pre- 
cisely, and subsequently on iteration. 
Limitations on predictive modeling; experiments. Even in the situations 
where the phenomena and relations required for prediction are quantifiable, the 
correctness (validity) of the models used for prediction is limited by many fac- 
tors: restricted knowledge of the laws of system behavior, inadequate data, ina- 
bility to deal effectively with very complex relations, and so on. 
Some of the difficulties are: 
- the data from passive observations alone may not reveal the cause- 
effect relations, 
- the causal laws that  we know, even for physical systems such as chem- 
ical reactors, are not enough alone to provide exact models because of the com- 
plexity of real systems. 
If their predictive models appear inadequate, the model builders may sug- 
gest ezper iments .  An experiment might consist, for example, of testing a pro- 
posed course of action on a sample, and on a parallel control group, observing 
the results, and then using them for arriving at  conclusions about the action, or 
for building a model and modifying the action before it is applied full-scale 
( ~ i e c k e n  1974). 
An experiment can tell how the system reacts in the  present, but not how it 
will react  in the future, under changed conditions that cannot be duplicated in 
the experiment. Because of this and other limitations of experiments, we should 
recognize that experimentation alone can hardly be a substitute for predictive 
modeling, but should be considered a supplementary activity. 
Another difficulty in predictive modeling arises when the system being 
modeled contains one or more decisionmakers whose decisions influence the 
outcome. Their behavior has to be incorporated into the model. To do this indi- 
vidual "players" may be inserted into the model to  represent something like a 
manager, a legislative body, a political party, or some element of society or  even 
a sector of the economy, that  in our present state of knowledge cannot be 
modeled satisfactorily by a set  of equations or a computer program. The player 
is then supposed to act  like h s  real life conterpart would act.  Such human 
activity is often called role playing and the model a man-machine simulation. 
Models of this kind, although not necessarily involving computers, have 
been known for a long time under the names of operational games, war games, 
business games, etc. ,  depending on the context. 
No model can be fully validated; that  is, it can never be proved that  its out- 
put will conform to reality. We can, however, increase our confidence in its 
predictions by working with the model, checking it against other models and 
against historical data, but best is to  subject the model to a range of tests  and 
comparisons designed to reveal where it fails. Such tests  do not eliminate all 
uncertainty, but they do give the user an understanding of the extent and limits 
of the  model's predictive capabilities. 
Using models. Using a predictive model is in principle very simple: we take 
the proposed action as an  input to  it, the assumed or predicted future state of 
nature as another input, and work out the output, that  is, the model-predicted 
consequ.ences. 
It is important to  test the model for sensitivity: how much are the conse- 
quences changed if one modifies the parameters of the model and how much are  
the consequences changed if the exogenous factors are changed (sensitivity to 
environmental conditions). Sensitivity testing helps to make explicit the types 
and degrees of uncertainty that exist in the model outcome and to identify the 
dominant and controlling parameters. A similar investigation, but with respect 
to major changes in the assumptions about the future state of the world, is 
sometimes referred to as contingency analysis. See also Chapter 7. 
The actual techniques by which the consequences, for given inputs, are 
predicted depends on the kind of model, for example, whether it is an analytic 
model (an explicit mathematical relation or formula) or a judgmental (mental) 
model. However, all kinds of useful models should permit assessing sensitivities. 
We are well aware that the future can be determined only in a probabilistic 
way. It is therefore correct, a t  least in principle, to ask the model to predict the 
probabilistic features of the consequences. We may, for example, be interested 
in the range or interval within which a consequence will be contained with some 
given (and high) probability. Obtaining answers of this kind requires much infor- 
mation, whch will seldom be found in systems analysis applications. In particu- 
lar, adequate probabilistic data on the future state of nature, i.e., on future 
environmental inputs, would have to be available, but seldom are.  
We should also mention that the techniques of estimating the probabilistic 
features of the outcomes may be quite complex and time-consuming. Unless an 
analytic model is available, a stochastic computer  s imula t ion  can be carried out. 
In t h s  technique, the computer model is subjected to a large number of suitably 
generated random inputs, whi.ch imitate the stochastic environment. A statisti- 
cal analysis of the outputs provides the required probabilistic data. This kind of 
a.nalysis is important in some applications. In many cases, however, a computer 
simulation is the least desirable model. It is costly, except in the model-building 
stage, and it has low insight, since it does not show how the observed outcomes 
are obtained. Nevertheless, it: may be the only choice open (see Chapter 7 and 
Majone and Quade 1979). 
In most applications of systems analysis, the scarcity of data and the inac- 
curacy of models do not permit or justify a precise probabilistic analysis. We 
should, however, always realize the probabilistic character of the problem and 
proceed cautiously. A common pitfall, for example, is to take the expected 
value of the environmental input as a basis for determining the expected value 
of the outcome. A simple example will explain what happens. Assume a crop 
increases with humidity, but is more sensitive to drought than to above-average 
rainfall. Then, calculating the average crop on the basis of average rainfall is 
wrong, because the losses due to dry years will be more than the gains in the 
wet years. In more precise terms, what we should do is to calculate the average 
value of y in equation (1). It cannot be obtained by putting the average value of 
e into the formula, unless the relation is linear. 
Summary remarks. Let us come back to the main questions addressed at 
the beginning of t h s  section: 
- What will the future of the world be i f  the action is taken? 
- How certain is the answer that analysis can supply? 
In many worthwhile applications of systems analysis, in spite of all the 
efforts that can be put into model-building and forecasting activities, we usually 
cannot claim that  the consequences we predict will happen with reasonably hgh 
probabilities. It should be understood from what has been said that  t h s  uncer- 
tainty in the answer cannot be entirely overcome. Is it, then, reasonable to 
spend money and time on systems analysis, to build and use models in cases 
where they cannot predict accurately? 
The answer is yes. For one thing, the decisionmaker has to make a decision 
anyway, and even imperfect assistance by analysis may be better than pure 
ju.dgment and intuition. Second, analysis may permit comparing alternatives, 
even if the absolute accuracy of predicting the consequences is low. 
For example, assume there is no probabilistic forecast of the future, but 
only a few scenarios. If we then detect, by a consistent model-based analysis, 
that the consequences of action al  are better than those of action a2 under all, 
or most, of the representative scenarios, this result is a useful indication. 
Other useful indications that a model can provide are indications of sensi- 
tivity: a course of action that makes a system insensitive to exogenous factors, 
or makes it resilient, that is, able to recover from shocks, is a preferable one, 
even if we do not know its consequences exactly. 
7. COMPARING AND RANKJNG ALTERNATIVES 
Difficulties of ranking. Assume the alternatives have been selected and 
screened, and the presumed consequences of each determined. How can we 
compare them? An obvious method is to display the alternatives in a suitable 
framework so that the differences and similarities stand out. The analyst may 
also do more; for example, he may rank the alternatives according to one or 
more specified criteria, so that the decisionmaker's choice is made easier. 
There are several reasons why ranking alternatives can be difficult: 
- In most practical cases alternative A may be superior to B in some 
aspects and inferior in the others. 
- The diverse consequences of an alternative cannot be aggregated into 
a single performance index that bears a satisfactory relation to attaining the 
objectives. 
- When outcomes are spread over time, the rankings may change with 
time. 
- Theremayexistconsequencesthatarenonquantifiableonagenerally 
accepted basis and that may be quantified by judgment only. 
- The future conditions under whch the proposed alternatives will have 
to function are uncertain. At the same time, the range of probable future condi- 
tions is wide and bears strongly on the presumed consequences. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties and all the incommensurability of 
various effects and consequences of the alternatives, a choice has to be made by 
the decisionmaker 
We are concerned about the extent to which this decision can be assisted by 
the analyst, for  example, the extent and the means by which we can reduce the 
variety of features of each alternative into possibly few, but nevertheless reli- 
able, indicators. 
A danger is oversimplification, i .e.,  of trying to merge too many thngs  into 
a single index value. One should not neglect the fact that  a subjective judge- 
ment by the decisionmaker on a set of displayed impacts may be more adequate 
than an index arrived a t  by arbitrary quantification, questionable arguments, 
and value estimates by the analysts. Simple judgement may quite often lead to 
the right decision, as opposed to  an index-based decision, even though the index 
may have been correctly determined on the basis of the information available 
for the analyst. There is, however, a lot of significant research devoted to the 
problem of analyzing and modeling value systems. The study of ways of protect- 
ing the Oosterschelde estuary from flooding (described in Chapters 1 and 3) is 
an example in which the analysts wisely avoided any temptation to combine 
impacts into simple indices. 
Judgmental comparison and ranking. The simplest method, as mentioned 
above, is to display the impacts of the alternatives to the decisionmaker. Such a 
display is sometimes referred to as a scorecard (see the Oosterschelde example 
in Chapter 3). A scorecard aims to present the decisionmaker with the full spec- 
trum of consequences, both good and bad, and, where appropriate, with an indi- 
cation of who gets a benefit and who pays the cost. The decisionmaker can 
superimpose on t h ~ s  relatively objective information h s  feelings for the values, 
as well as incorporate the value judgments of the society he represents. This 
approach makes it also possible to show sensitivities, that is, to show how the 
impacts change when parameters and external conditions vary. One merely 
prepares a scorecard for the same alternatives under the changed conditions, 
and compares it with the previous one. 
The scorecard is also effective for multiple decisionrnakers, for each indivi- 
dual may form his own opinion based on h s  preferences and prejudices and a 
consensus can then be worked out through committee action. It is also easily 
understood by the public at  large. 
Any evaluation and ranking of the alternatives by analysts or experts may 
ignore important factors known to the decisionmaker but never made explicit to 
the analysts and experts. Therefore, such ranking may be unsatisfactory to the 
decisionmaker. For this reason alone, he should always be presented with the 
major alternatives and their impacts. In other words, when we present a 
decisionmaker with the result of someone else's evaluation, we should produce 
the scorecard for all highly ranked alternatives. 
The sheer mass of information, however, makes the use of indices of various 
sorts attractive. 
Cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit criteria. For the purpose of cornparsing 
and ranking alternatives, one often tries to describe their relative merits by 
means of one, or at  most a few, indicators (index value, figure of merit, or objec- 
tive function). Any such approach has to sacrifice the details, the individual 
features of the alternatives, for the sake of making comparison easier. 
Cost-effectiveness can be used to rank alternatives when there is a single 
dominant objective and the effectiveness of the various alternatives in attaining 
this objective can be measured on a single scale that is directly related to the 
objective, or is a good proxy for it. Alternatives are ranked either in terms of 
decreasing effectiveness for equal cost or, less frequently, in terms of increasing 
cost for equal effectiveness. Sometimes the ratio of cost to effectiveness is 
used, but t h s  practice is open to all the objections that apply to the use of 
ratios as criteria, for example, because t h s  kind of criterion masks the differ- 
ences in scale (Hi.tch and McKean 1960). 
The cost-effectiveness criterion is open to a number of objections. For one, 
even in the simplest cases, effectiveness may not measure value, which depends 
on the particular decisionmaker. For another, if the ranking is close, the 
decisionrnaker may want secondary effects taken into account. 
Another objection is that cost as used in cost-effectiveness reflects only the 
costs that are inputs-the money, resources, time, and manpower required to 
implement and maintain an alternative. The penalties or losses that accompany 
an implemented alternative-it may, for instance, interfere with something else 
that is wanted or bring undesirable consequences to other people-are costs that 
must be taken into account in other ways. 
Finally, even if cost and effectiveness are properly determined, the 
decisionrnaker is still faced with the problem of what to do. He needs both a 
way to rule out or accept the alternative of doing nothing and then one to set 
the scale of effort-either a cost he must not exceed or a n  effectiveness level he 
needs to achieve. The ratio of cost to effectiveness is not a satisfactory guide 
(Hitch and McKean 1960), even if he is totally uninterested in the scale of effort. 
Cost-benefit analysis, the most commonly used criterion in nalysis for pub- 
lic decisions, can, in a theoretical sense, handle the difficulties associated with 
cost-effectiveness. In this approach, the costs and benefits that follow each 
choice of an alternative, properly associated with the times and probability of 
occurrence, are measured in the same units, usually monetary. The excess of 
the total benefits over total costs is then the criterion. Whether such a transfer 
into monetary or other terms can properly include all, or an adequate number, 
of the relevant considerations is, however, a difficult question. For a more com- 
plete discussion, see Fischhof (1977), Mishan (1971), Sugden and Williams 
(1978), and Chapter 8. 
Value and utility approaches. If a scorecard approach is used, there will be 
as many scormecards for each alternative as there are scenarios of the future to 
be considered. On each scorecard the number of entries is the number of 
impacts multiplied by the number of alternatives to be evaluated and compared. 
The result may be that the amount of data is far too large for the decision- 
maker, without some aggregation, to make a judgmental ranking and choice. 
It is therefore understandable that there is a tendency to evaluate each 
alternative by a single indicator such as effec t iveness  for f i z ed  cost  or n e t  bene- 
f i t  in a cost-benefit analysis. We still have, of course, the various possible 
futures, and hence several different values of the chosen indicator for each 
alternative. Nevertheless, the display of alternatives is more lucid and tran- 
sparent. 
The concept of using a single indicator for many noncommensurable 
features of an object, in our case, an assumed alternative, is well known to deci- 
sion analysts, who have formalized it as a mul t ia t t r ibu te  v a l u e  func t ion  (Keeney 
and Raiffa 1977; Bel, Keeney, and Raiffa 1976; Raiffa 1968). In t h s  approach one 
tries to build a function by which a value v is assigned to the consequence of an 
alternative, whereby t h s  consequence is assumed to have n different value- 
relevant attribute s: 
v = f  ( y l ,  yz8 e t c . 1 ,  (2) 
where y  ,, y2, e t c .  are the value-relevant attributes measured on their appropri- 
ate scales. 
The function in (2) is a model of the decisionmaker's value system. It has to 
be established on the basis of h s  preferences, that is, of h s  individual judg- 
ments, and this is where the difficulties arise. In practice, it is, for many rea- 
sons, hard to obtain a value function that could replace the actual decision on a 
complex and unique issue. It is possible, however, for multiattribute value func- 
tions to be used as a guide or directive in the initial selection, design, and fine 
tuning of alternatives, or as one of the ranking criteria to be compared with 
rankings done by other means. A public official's preferences are, in general, 
the preferences of the people he represents; it is through this association that 
the analyst can get an idea of the decisionmaker's preferences. One still faces 
the problem of uncertainty: even if we agree to evaluate the alternatives by a 
single indicator for each of the possible states of nature, how should they be 
ranked, since we do not know which of these states of nature will occur? 
Let us assume that, from one source or another, the probabilities of the 
various future states of nature are known or can be estimated. It seems quite 
natural in this case, or at  least simplest, to rank the alternatives on the basis of 
the mathematical expectation (expected value) of the outcome. 
Using the multiattribute value function expressed by equation (2), which 
assigns a single value indicator to a given alternative under one state of nature, 
one can calculate the average value for each alternative over all possible states 
of nature. Then, the alternatives can be ranked according to the average, i.e., 
expected, values. 
It should be noted, however, that a straightforward average may not indi- 
cate the choice that a given decisionmaker would make. 
To take account of this, we use the notion of u t i l i t y ,  a basic concept used in 
the theory of decision u n d e r  u n c e r t a i n t y .  Thls theory assigns utilities to conse- 
quences in such a way that ranking expected utilities of alternatives is the same 
as the decisionmaker's preference order for the same alternatives. 
Utilities are assigned to consequences by means of ut i l i t y  functions; a util- 
ity function describes the attitude of the given decisionmaker toward risk, and 
is thus different for risk-averse and risk-prone decisionmakers (Keeney and 
Raiffa 1977). 
Direct use of utility theory, i. e., of utility functions and the expected utility 
principle, for ranking alternatives and, in particular, for a final choice, cannot 
be recommended without reservation. Assigning utility via utility functions 
involves a great deal of judgment by the analyst; several simplifying assumptions 
with respect to the form of these functions are also indispensable. Nevertheless, 
as in the case of rr~iltiattribute value functions, expected utility may be valuable 
as one of the means by whch the alternatives can be screened and assigned a 
tentative ranking, even if it cannot be recommended as a unique and ultimate 
criterion for choice. 
Summary remarks. Relatively little can be added to what was said in the 
first paragraph of this section: comparing alternatives is, in all practical cases, 
difficult. We should also remember that, although comparison and choice go 
together, the two parts are done by different people. It is the duty of the 
analyst to provide a comparison of alternatives and possibly a ranking, but it is 
the right and responsibility of the decisionmaker to make the choice. 
It is, therefore, reasonable not to rely entirely on the rankings provided by 
cost-benefit, multiattribute value functions, or utility functions. A scorecard of 
the alternatives, reduced, perhaps, to the most .relevant attributes, should 
accompany any rank-ordered list of alternatives. 
The analyst should not be upset if the choice of the decisionmaker is the 
third-ranked or fourth-ranked alternative. Such a choice indicates only that 
there are additional aspects and values that the decisionmaker did not disclose 
before, or that were misunderstood by the analyst. The analysis at this stage 
may be considered a success if the decisionmaker has made an analysis-based 
decision in the sense that he has chosen a course of action taking into account 
consequences that have been duly and appropriately analyzed. We must 
rem.ember, however, that the analyst's goal is not merely to find the course of 
action best suited to achieve the decisionmaker's objectives and satisfy h s  con- 
straints, but to find the course of action closest to this ideal that can be 
accepted by the other participants in the decisionm.aking process and then 
implemented without undesirable modification, or extra cost and delay. 
As mentioned in section 4.2 the analyst's role does not necessarily end at  
the choice by the decisionmakers of a particular course of action. Analysts, 
although sometimes not the original analysts, will be called on to assist with 
implementation, especially in the early part of thi.s process when there may be a 
need to interpret aspects of the program, as well as for modifications due to c1.r- 
cumstances that were impossible to anticipate earlier. Other analysts-they 
should not be the original analysts-will also play an important role when it 
comes to evaluating the results of the implemented action, and the original 
analysis itself. 
As a final word, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that success in 
applied systems analysis, however it is measured, depends more on knowledge of 
the subject matter and the clarity of the objectives than on knowledge of its 
methods. 
If the reader compares what has been said in t h s  chapter with the accounts 
of systems analyses set forth in Chapters 1 and 3, he will see some connections-- 
but perhaps not as many as he would have expected. The reason is a simple 
one: In published accounts of completed systems analyses the authors focus 
attention on the findings and the direct path that led to them, suppressing all of 
the contributing activity that does not contribute directly to the results. Thus, 
for the most part, one can only imagine the false starts, the approaches that did 
not work, the debates over objectives, the alternatives that proved to be unin- 
teresting, the data that were inadequate, the interactions with the client in the 
process of developing the framework for the analysis, and so on and so on. 
These matters could be discussed, but only by the analysts directly involved, 
and the resulting length would exceed what seems reasonable for a handbook- 
nor would most analysts want so much washing hanging on the line. 
Thus, t h s  chapter distills from many experiences what many analysts have 
learned in the hope that it will help future investigators--but mth the warning 
that everything that is said here must be reconsidered carefully in the light of 
the case in hand. Experience in facing such issues is an essential part of an 
analyst's training, but, whle some of this experience can be passed on in 
papers, books, and this Handbook ,  much will have to be learned on the job. An 
apprenticeship under a wise and experienced systems analysis leader is the best 
way of learning the craft. Perhaps the best use of this Handbook  for the fled- 
gling analyst is in connection with such an experience, to provide questions, con- 
trasting experience, and an entry to the large literature that can extend his 
experience. 
T h s  chapter has discussed systems analysis as though a single decision- 
maker were being served--and, indeed, it began with an argument that  this was 
an  appropriate focus. On the other hand, all of the examples of systems analysis 
presented in Chapters 1 and 3 clearly involve more complicated administrative 
situations: For the simplest case--that dealing with improving blood availability 
and utilization--it would be fair to  say that  the head of the Greater New York 
Blood Program was the client, but t h s  official's operations are hedged about by 
a very large number of administratively independent heads of hospital blood 
banks, all of whom had to agree to  a cooperative arrangement of the sort pro- 
posed by the analysts before i t  could be brought into being and be effective. In 
fact,  persuading these blood bank officials that the  new cooperative system was 
in everyone's best interests was one of the key implementation tasks facing the 
analysts a t  the end of their analytic work. 
Similarly, the Chief of the Wilmington Bureau of Fire can be considered the 
client for this case, but he too was enmeshed in a bureaucratic and political 
s tructure that  constrained h s  choices, and had to  be convinced of their value 
before they could become effective. Not the least of these influences came from 
the firemen's labor union. While the Netherlands Rijkswaterstaat commissioned 
the Rand Corporation's systems analysis work (as an extension of their own work 
on protecting the Oosterschelde estuary from flooding), the network of decision- 
makers was very large, with the Netherlands parliament playing a n  ultimately 
deciding role. 
For the IIASA study of the  world's energy future there was, of course, no 
world decisionmaker t o  commission the study or to report its findings to; 
ra ther ,  there were thousands of persons in national governments, energy enter- 
prises, and the general public interested in the findings, and many of these 
could reflect them in some way in their own activities or attitudes. However, for 
a government or an energy enterprise to make decisions sympathetic to the 
IIASA study's findings would almost invariably involve the organization making a 
complementary study of its own focused sharply on its own concerns. In fact ,  
the IlASA world-wide analysis has been followed by a number of such studies. 
In view of the evidence of our examples that the decisionmaking situation is 
almost invariably complex, can we sustain the argument at  the beginning of this 
chapter that it is useful to begin the discussion with the presumption that there 
is a single decisionmaker being served by the systems analyst? We certainly 
cannot do so if we then try to carry this presumption into real life. However, we 
can accept this convention provided it is a useful device for thought and 
discussion-as we hope t h s  chapter has established. It may be particularly use- 
ful if it serves to sharpen the analyst's appreciation of the complications of the 
actual decisionmaking situation he is facing, and forces h m  to t h n k  construc- 
tively and work effectively toward it. Otherwise, knowing that  there is no 
decisionmaker for a global problem, he may fail to sharpen his findings suffi- 
ciently to make them usable to any decisionmakers with smaller purviews. 
In sum, the unitary decisionrnaker of this chapter stands for a class. In this 
chapter we have been able to t h n k  of the class as a unit, but in practice the 
analyst will eventually have to consider the in&vidual members of the class to 
an appropriate extent. To the analysts bruised in the decision wars the class 
may seem a Hydra-headed monster--but it must be considered, both collectively 
and individually. 
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